What is Left of Apel’s Part b of Discourse Ethics? An Evaluation’s Attempt

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to focus on the problematic aspects of Karl-Otto Apel’s part B of discourse ethics in order to understand to what extent it has to be considered an essential element of this theoretical paradigm. On the one hand, and in particular, I will criticise the key argument put forward by Apel to show, in contrast to Jürgen Habermas’ stance, the necessity of part B of discourse ethics. I refer to the thesis that, in some conditions, especially when strategic action prevails on communicative action, the moral principle U is not applicable, i.e. not legitimately expectable (nicht zumutbar) since too demanding. I will maintain that the application of U, instead, is always legitimately expectable: otherwise, a selfsuspension of ethics would occur. On the other hand, however, I will defend the core of such a part B, i.e. the integration-principle E: this makes it possible to emphasise the utopian content of discourse ethics, which instead risks being affected in Habermas’ version. In my view, though, such appreciation of principle E is not enough to justify the introduction of a part B, which therefore turns out to be, ultimately, unjustified. Apel himself recognises, indeed, that principle E should already be grounded within part A. I will defend, however, an alternative path to Apel’s to justify principle E, arguing that such a principle could not be grounded wiithout explaining why the realisation of the ideal into the real communication community has to be considered as a value in itself.