Wahrhaftigkeit als selbstverantwortung zur mitverantwortung. Eine transzendentalpragmatische Untersuchung

Abstract

With this revision of the idea of truthfulness it will become apparent that, in contrast to Habermas’ “validity claim to truthfulness”, truthfulness is a presupposition of any “meaning-valid” (K.-O. Apel) meaning of something through which a speaker says what he really means himself. This “mode of handling speech-acts” truthfully any speaker is capable to fulfill with certainty.
From a meaning-critique perspective, this leads to a differentiation of truthfulness at three different levels, at which a speaker is required to comply with specific conditions of fulfillment in order to be truthful in a full sense.
At the first level, he has to be honest and transparent; at the second level, he has to raise validity claims in regards of fundamental-intersubjective criticism of every speech-act and he has to justify these validity claims as well as possible; at the third level, for his speech-acts and acts, a speaker or actor has to assume selfresponsibility towards co-responsibility with and against all discourse partners.