Principle of responsibility for the future and principle of discourse

The challenge to the philosophical foundation of the Anthropocene - a dialogue with Hans Jonas and Karl-Otto Apel

Abstract

Introductorily, the authors show, how two completely different thinkers, namely Karl-Otto Apel, a language-pragmatic post-Kantian, and Hans Jonas, a post-aristotelic ontologist and phenomenologist, thought about the moral-philosophical challenge of the ecological crisis of mankind and answered it on the principle level (chap. 1 und 2). Considering the territorially and temporally nearly illimittible impacts and perilous damages caused by particular high technologies but even more by our everyday „exploitation and eventual destruction of our natural environment and the biological endangering of Man“ (Jonas), they elaborate „the urgency of the principle question”. In the technologically progressing Anthropocene „imperatives of a new kind“ are required, imperatives concerning the new range of human responsibilty, or better: „co-responsibility“ (Apel, Böhler), as the range of all who benefit from it and who know about it (i. e. of all possible members of a discourse). This new range is so vast, that it includes the whole future of mankind (chap. 3).

Admittedly, Jonas‘ speculative ontology is not able to prove incontestably the obligation of the responsibility for the future. Apel‘s transcendental pragmatics opens the way to this proof, which Berlin discourse pragmatics consequently continues: by reflecting in actu on me/you as partners in a dialogue, who now make validity claims for their arguments (chap. 4 und 5).

In chap. 6 the authors show, that Jonas – in close proximity tot he principle of discourse consensus and with regard to Pascal‘s thought experiment „of the element of wager in acting“ – is able to substantiate an absolute exclusion criterion for risiks in the highly technological civilisation: „There can be expected no agreement from future mankind nor can it be supposed to its non-being or being dehumanized“. However, Jonas does not differentiate between a de facto discourse and a mere argumentative and thus ideal discourse. Furthermore Jonas understands discourse ethics totally according to Habermas, i. e. as theory of a practical discourse led by benevolent people. So he comes to the false assumption of the principle of discourse resting on a vicious circle, because it already presupposed the „benevolence“ of the participants in a discourse. In contrast to this, transcendental pragmatics resp. transcendental discourse pragmatics begins reflexively with the skeptic. It shows, that the one that cannot be doubted in a sensible argument is absolutely valid and strictly obligatory (chap. 7).

But Jonas falls short when he defines responsibility as an asymmetric, non-reciprocal relationship of care only. For also the caring person should be able to demonstrate in a symmetric discourse that his/her care is not authoritarian but legitimate: That means, the care deserves the consent and recognition (concerning as well the How as the Why) of all possible discourse partners. Responsibility never only means care, but always at the same time justification and recognition.